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Constitutional Law-Tax Sales: Notice to Interested Parties
When a taxpayer fails to pay his property taxes, the taxing authority may
have the power to sell the property to recover the delinquent taxes. The taxing
authority generally begins the process by placing a tax lien on the property.
Such a tax lien may then be sold to a private purchaser or kept by the taxing
authority. In either case, the property owner has a redemption period during
which he can redeem his property by paying the taxes owed. If the property
owner does not redeem his property within the redemption period, the tax lien
may be foreclosed and the property owner's interest permanently lost.' Since
tax sales may deprive owners of their property, the tax sale process must com-
ply with due process requirements under the fifth and fourteenth amendments
to the United States Constitution2 as well as the due process requirements of
most state constitutions. 3 Among the requirements of due process for the af-
fected party are notice of the proceeding against him and the chance to be
1. North Carolina's tax sale statute is typical. Failure to pay property taxes may result in an
original tax lien vesting in a taxing authority, under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-355(a) (1979), which
may be kept by the taxing authority, or alternatively, the taxing authority may sell the lien. Id.
§ 105-369 (Cum. Supp. 1983). To foreclose a lien, a private purchaser must proceed under id.
§ 105-374 (1979 & Cum. Supp. 1983). This type of foreclosure proceeds as a judicial action. The
lienor files a complaint against the following:
The listing taxpayer and spouse (if any), the current owner, all other taxing units having
tax liens, all other lienholders of record, and all persons who would be entitled to be
made parties to a court action (in which no deficiency judgment is sought) to foreclose a
mortgage on such property ....
Id. § 105-374(c) (1979). Each is to be made a party and served with summons. Id. Further, filing
of the complaint is lisplendens, and thus serves
as notice of the pendency of the foreclosure action, and every person whose interest in
the real property is subsequently acquired or whose interest therein is subsequently regis-
tered or recorded shall be bound by all proceedings taken in the foreclosure action after
the filing of the complaint in the same manner as if those persons had been made parties
to the action.
Id. § 105-374(d). After a judgment of sale, id. § 105-374(k), the sale is held "at the courthouse
door." Id. § 105-374(m).
The taxing authority may use this procedure, or may use the alternative procedure, the "in
rem method of foreclosure," id. § 105-375 (1979 & Cum. Supp. 1983). The intent of this section,
declared on the face of the statute, is to provide "as an alternative to G.S. 105-374, a simple and
inexpensive method of enforcing payment of taxes necessarily levied, to the knowledge of all
persons, for the requirements of local governments in this State." Id. § 105-375(a) (1979). Rather
than file a complaint, a taxing authority is empowered to file a certificate disclosing the tax delin-
quency information with the clerk of the superior court. Id. § 105-375(b) (Cum. Supp. 1983). This
docketing then "shall constitute a valid judgment against the real property described therein." Id.
§ 105-375(d) (1979). Any time after six months and before two years from the indexing of the
judgment, execution will be issued at the request of the tax collector, and the real property will be
sold by the sheriff, with certain exceptions not relevant here. See id. § 105-375(i) (Cum. Supp.
1983).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."). Id. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall. . . deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
The Supreme Court has held that tax sales are not per se unconstitutional, even if they do not
provide the same notice as in a law suit (te., a summons). "It involves no violation of due process
of law, when it is executed according to customary forms and established usages." Bell's Gap
R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 239 (1890).
3. See, e.g., N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 19 ("No person shall be... in any manner deprived of
his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land.").
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heard.4 The form that this notice must take is a matter of statute, varying
from publication and posting to personal service.5 The United States Supreme
Court, when faced with the question of what constitutes adequate notice under
the federal constitution, has consistently disfavored publication. Until re-
cently, however, the Supreme Court had not ruled on the acceptability of pub-
lication notice to mortgagees in tax sales. In Mennonite Board of Missions v.
Adams 6 the Court held that, when a mortgagee is to be deprived of his re-
corded interest in a tax sale, publication notice alone does not meet the re-
quirements of due process.
In Adams plaintiff (MBM) sold property in 19737 to a purchaser who then
mortgaged the property back to MBM. Under the terms of the mortgage, the
purchaser-mortgagor was to pay the property taxes. In 1974 the purchaser-
mortgagor stopped paying her property taxes, although she continued to make
mortgage payments to MBM.8 The county notified the mortgagor of her tax
delinquency and of a procedure to sell her property for nonpayment of taxes.
This notice of tax sale, which was required by the Indiana tax sale statute,9
was sent to the mortgagor in 1977. The county, in compliance with the statute,
also posted and had published notice of the tax sale. With his high bid, de-
fendant Adams bought the property at the tax sale on August 8, 1977. A two
year redemption period followed the tax sale, during which either mortgagor
or mortgagee could have reclaimed the property by paying the county treas-
urer the total amount of taxes and assessments that the tax purchaser had paid,
with interest. 10
Neither party to the mortgage redeemed the property. Adams received a
tax deed at the end of the redemption period." The county auditor again sent
notice to the mortgagor-in compliance with the redemption statute-that she
4. "The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard. This
right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and
can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest." Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (citation omitted) (quoting Grannis v. Or-
dean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).
A different tack was taken by a federal court in Illinois in upholding the constitutionality of
that state's tax sale statute on the basis that owners have the chance to redeem their property.
Balthazar v. Mad, Ltd., 301 F. Supp. 103 (N.D Ill. 1969).
5. New Jersey, for example, now requires personal service on a landowner against whose
property a taxing authority intends to institute an in rem foreclosure action. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 54:5-104.42 (West Supp. 1983). Oregon, on the other hand, expressly codifies the legal presump-
tion that a landowner should always be aware of all legal proceedings that could affect his land,
and requires only publication. OR. REV. STAT. § 312.040 (1983). North Carolina requires per-
sonal service in a tax foreclosure only if it is in the nature of a judicial sale, but a taxing authority
can avoid the rigors of a judicial proceeding by using the alternative in rem tax foreclosure. See
supra note 1.
6. 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983).
7. Id. at 2708.
8. Id. at 2709.
9. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-24-1 (Bums 1984) provides for the yearly sale of real property
on which tax payments are delinquent for fifteen months. The tax assessor must send notice by
certified mail of the sale to the owner at his last known address. Id. § 6-1.1-24-4.
10. Id. §§ 6-1.1-25-1 to -4. The tax sale purchaser thus would receive his investment back.
11. Mennonite Bd. of Missions, Inc. v. Adams, 427 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981),
rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983).
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had thirty days to redeem her property before a deed would issue to the tax
purchaser.' 2 Again, no notice was sent to MBM, the mortgagee. MBM did
not know of the tax sale until the redemption period had run and Adams had
received his tax deed. The mortgagor had continued to make mortgage pay-
ments to MBM during the redemption period and first informed MBM of the
problem almost a week after Adams received his deed.
13
Adams sued for quiet title on November 1, 1979.14 The mortgagor did
not contest the suit, and the trial court granted summary judgment for Adams.
Quiet title for Adams extinguished MBM's lien on the property.' 5 MBM chal-
lenged the judgment in the Indiana Court of Appeals on the constitutional
grounds that it had been deprived of its property interest without due process,
and that the tax sale statute's discrimination in favor of property owners de-
nied equal protection to mortgagees.16 The court of appeals affirmed the judg-
ment for Adams, relying on state law precedent.' 7 The court also felt
compelled by the presumption that interested parties know the law, and there-
fore know when their interest is threatened by operation of law.18 As for
MBM's equal protection argument, the court found that discrimination be-
12. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-25-6 (Bums 1984). The records of the Elkhart county auditor's
office show that timely certified mail notice was sent of the 1977 tax sale and expiration of the
redemption period in 1979, but that the mortgagor never picked up either mailing. Brief for Ap-
pellant at I 1 n.8, Adams, 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983).
13. The brief for MBM also suggested "that the prospects of a Mennonite reading a legal
notice is [sic] slim at best," noting that "Mennonites seldom become involved in litigation because
of their religious beliefs." MBM would thus be less calculated than others to be apprised of a tax
sale by publication. Brief for Appellant at 56-57, Adams, 103 S. Ct. 2706.
14. MBM had no standing to contest the quiet title suit. Indiana law permitted only defenses
of the owner that attacked the alleged failure to pay the tax, that showed the tax had been levied
wrongly, or that established that the owner had properly redeemed the property. IND. CODE ANN.
§ 6-1.1-25-16 (Bums 1984).
15. Id. The Indiana Court of Appeals explained: "Under IC 6-1.1-25-4, the execution of the
tax deed vests in the grantee a fee simple absolute estate free and clear of all liens. The quiet title
action may be instituted to finalize that action, but the tax deed becomes absolute after one year.
IC 6-1.1-25-17." Adams, 427 N.E.2d at 687 n.4.
North Carolina also imposes a one-year statute of limitations on actions challenging a tax
foreclosure. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-377 (1979).
16. Adams, 427 N.E.2d at 687.
17. See First Says. & Loan Ass'n of Cent. Ind. v. Furnish, 367 N.E.2d 596 (Ind. Ct. App.
1977). In Furnish the court of appeals refused to apply Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950), to tax lien sales. See infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. As
one commentator lamented,
Unfortunately, the court of appeals failed to consider the obvious fact that tax sales are
generally known to be conducted in a careless, haphazard manner which does not pro-
duce a fair price for the property. Lack of notice to interested parties more than likely is
one of the reasons for low prices at tax sales.
Townsend, Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Law: Secured Transactions and Creditors'
,Rights, 12 IND. L. REv. 289, 294 (1978).
18. This presumption, which may be most easily referred to as the "caretaker" concept of
land ownership, may be traced to the distinction between in personam and in rem actions first
expounded by the Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). As the Court stated in
Mullane v. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 316 (1950): "[Ihe state may indulge the
assumption that [the property owner]... has left some caretaker under a duty to let him know
that it is being jeopardized." For a thorough analysis of this theory and other points relevant to
notice in tax sales, see Note, The Constitutionality of Notice by Publication in Tax Sale Proceedings,
84 YALE L. 1505 (1975).
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tween homeowner and mortgage holder was justified.19
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the ques-
tion whether the notice provided to MBM under the Indiana tax sale statute
met the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment. The Court
held the manner of notice unconstitutional and remanded the case.20 The
Court held that due process required notice under the standard first set down
inMullane v. CentralHanover Bank and Trust Co .21 In Mullane the Court had
held that, before a process that deprives interested parties of property is insti-
tuted, those parties must receive notice "reasonably calculated" to bring the
impending process to their attention.22 Applying Mullane to the facts in Ad-
ams, the Court found that "since a mortgagee clearly has a legally protected
property interest, he is entitled to notice reasonably calculated to apprise him
of a pending tax sale."23 The Court reasoned that publication notice serves
primarily to inform potential tax purchasers of an upcoming tax sale, but fails
to inform those who already have an interest in the property, since they are
unlikely to read published notices of tax sales. Nor could a mortgagee rely on
his mortgagor for notice if the two are not in privity,24 and the owner has
"failed to take steps necessary to preserve his own property interest. ' 25 While
recognizing that "sophisticated creditors" could monitor newspapers and other
sources of published notice, the Court pointed out that some mortgagees might
not be so sophisticated or knowledgeable; further, "a party's ability to take
steps to safeguard its interests does not relieve the State of its constitutional
19. The court noted three considerations: (1) the legislature's concern for the mortgagor-
homeowner, as evidenced in the "financial and protective traditions of this society"; (2) the under-
lying purpose of tax sales (i e., to collect delinquent taxes); and (3) the expectation that mortga-
gees, most of whom are in the business of lending money, have taken steps to protect their
monetary interests. Adams, 427 N.E.2d at 689-90.
20. Adams, 103 S. Ct. at 2712.
21. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
22. Id. at 314. The Court stated:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is
to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity
to present their objections . . . . The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to
convey the required information . . . and it must afford a reasonable time for those
interested to make their appearance ....
Id.
23. Adams, 103 S. Ct. at 2711.
24. An Illinois court agreed that mortgagees are to be included among the persons to be
notified of tax sales, but it excluded those mortgagees whose mortgages were not in the chain of
title because they were given before the acquisition of record title. Landis v. Miles Homes Inc., I
Ill. App. 3d 331, 273 N.E.2d 153 (1971). This is a more difficult situation than the example of lack
of privity; presumably privity would not matter in Adams as long as the mortgage was recorded.
But if the mortgage is not in the chain of title, the Adams dissent's observation becomes relevant,
that the tax assessor's "burden is not limited to mailing notice. Rather, the State must have some-
one check the records and ascertain with respect to each delinquent taxpayer whether there is a
mortgage, perhaps whether the mortgage has been paid off, and whether there is a dependable
address." Adams, 103 S. Ct. at 2715 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The limits of reasonable as-
certainability may be reached when a mortgage is not in the chain of title and there is no privity
between owner and mortgagee.




The Court stated the rule of Adams in broad language: "Notice by mail
or other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional
precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or property
interests of any party, whether unlettered or well versed in commercial prac-
tices, if its name and address are reasonably ascertainable."2 7 This language
indicates that the rule of actual notice for due process should apply not only to
mortgagees but also to holders of mineral or water rights, or of any other re-
corded interests.2 8 More significantly, the Adams rule should apply to the
most obvious interested party: the owner. The extent to which the Supreme
Court intended Adams to require actual notice to owners before loss of prop-
erty in a tax sale, however, is unclear.
A dissent by three Justices strongly criticized the breadth of the Court's
rule in Adams, finding the rule "squarely at odds" with the approach to suffi-
ciency of notice given in Mullane.29 "The plain language of iMullane is clear,"
said the dissenting Justices, "that the Court expressly refused to reject con-
structive notice asper se insufficient." 30 According to the dissent, the Mullane
test of reasonableness is not a formula, but rather a balancing of the state's
interest against the individuars fourteenth amendment interest. InAdams the
dissent would have found that the state's vital interest in collecting property
taxes outweighed MBM's mortgage interest, especially since "the Board could
have safeguarded its interest with a minimum amount of effort." 3 1 In the dis-
sent's view, the Court did not merely extend Mullane and its descendant notice
cases; it rejected them.
The starting point for evaluating theAdams decision in the context of due
process law must be Mullane, the 1950 case in which the Supreme Court first
attacked the sufficiency of notice by publication.32 In Mullane the bank pro-
ceeded to settle certain trust accounts. Rather than mail notice of this settle-
ment to the beneficiaries, the bank relied on publication of the settlement in
newspapers. The Court held:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably cal-
26. Id. at 2712.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Pickens v. Adams, 7 I1. 2d 283, 131 N.E.2d 38 (1955) (usual tax redemption law
applies to mineral estates); Christie-Stewart, Inc. v. Paschall, 502 P.2d 1265 (Okla. 1972) (owners
o" mineral interests in land required to take note of taxing statutes and disposition of their inter-
ests). This note will refer only to mortgagees, but much of the analysis also applies to owners of
other interests in property.
29. Adams, 103 S. Ct. at 2713 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 2714 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 2716 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
32. Mullane also indicated that the Court was ready to discount the importance of the "his-
toric antithesis" between in rem and in personam actions. Noting that the distinction was rooted
in classifications drawn by Roman law, the Court said it did "not rest the power of the State to
resort to constructive service in this proceeding upon how its courts or this Court may regard this
historic antithesis." The interests of the state would be sufficient to allow it "to determine the
interests of all claimants, resident or nonresident, provided its procedure accords full opportunity
to appear and be heard." Mullane, 330 U.S. at 312-13.
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culated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections. . . The notice must be of such nature as reason-
ably to convey the required information . . . and it must afford a
reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance.
33
The bank regularly mailed beneficiaries statements of the trust accounts
at issue, and the Court found it reasonable and practical for the bank trustees
to include notice of proposed settlement in one of the regular statement mail-
ings. The trustees could not simply rely on publishing notice of the settlement
in newspapers: "Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident
an advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a newspa-
per. . .. -34 Merely going through the motions of giving notice to the world
would not suffice if it was reasonable to give actual notice. The Mullane Court
did not go as far as to deny the constitutionality of notice by publication in all
circumstances. The Court noted that if a procedure provided "due regard for
the practicalities and particularities of the case,"'35 the constitutional require-
ments of due process would be met by publication notice.
36
The Supreme Court applied the Mullane rule in two subsequent condem-
nation cases and found notice by publication insufficient to satisfy due process
requirements in that context. In Walker v. City oftutchinson37 the Court dis-
allowed the city's condemnation of a piece of land after the city had provided
the owner only publication notice. The Court noted: "It is common knowl-
edge that mere newspaper publication rarely informs a landowner of proceed-
ings against his property."' 38 In a later condemnation case, Schroeder v. City of
New York, 39 the city published in newspapers notice of a proposed waterway
alteration and also posted notice near, but not on, the complaining land-
owner's property. The Court also found this form of notice insufficient under
Mullane: "The general rule that emerges from the Mullane case is that notice
by publication is not enough with respect to a person whose name and address
are known or very easily ascertainable and whose legally protected interests
are directly affected by the proceedings in question."140
33. Id. at 314.
34. Id. at 315.
35. Id. at 314.
36. Justice O'Connor's strong dissent in4dams stresses the balancing approach required to
fit the particularities of the situation:
Whether a particular method of notice is reasonable depends on the outcome of the
balance between the 'interest of the State' and 'the individual interest sought to be pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment.' . . . It is the primary responsibility of the State
to strike this balance, and we will upset this process only when the State strikes the
balance in an irrational manner.
Adams, 103 S. Ct. at 2713 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314). Justice
O'Connor argues that the totality of the situation favors an assumption that one whose property
interest might be threatened should make the effort to safeguard that interest; the state has a "vital
interest" in collecting property taxes "in whatever reasonable manner that it chooses." Id. at 2715.
37. 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
38. Id. at 116.
39. 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
40. Id. at 212-13.
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In both tax sales and condemnations property is taken. Therefore, it is
logical that both kinds of actions must meet the requirements of due process.
The two actions differ, however, in one essential: condemnation follows from a
unique government decision; tax sales follow from the taxpayer's failure to
meet a regular obligation. A property owner does not expect a condemnation
proceeding, so he should not be expected to watch newspapers for announce-
ments of condemnations affecting his land. Tax sales, on the other hand, re-
sult from delinquency in meeting a regular requirement, payment of property
taxes. As the dissent in Adams argues, the regularity of the tax duty puts the
taxpayer on notice that he risks losing his property if he fails to pay his tax.
41
Putting aside for the moment the validity of this theory as it applies to owners,
it clearly does not apply to interested but unknowing parties-for instance,
mortgagees like MBM-who do not know that taxes have fallen in arrears.
Since such parties have property interests protected by the Constitution, it
would seem that Adams at least provides a clear case rule: If the mortgagee's
name and address are reasonably ascertainable, he must be provided actual
notice before he can be deprived of his interest in a tax sale proceeding. The
remainder of this note will point out, however, thatAdams is not the last word
on the sufficiency of notice under due process in a tax sale for either mortga-
gees or owners.
Adams specifically held unconstitutional the provision of the Indiana tax
sale statute that permitted a tax purchaser to perfect title in property bought at
a tax sale without requiring actual notice to a mortgagee of record.42 "When
the mortgagee is identified in a mortgage that is publicly recorded, construc-
tive notice by publication must be supplemented by notice mailed to the mort-
gagee's last known available address, or by personal service." 43 The Court
based this ruling squarely on Mullane. Publication serves primarily to inform
potential purchasers of a tax sale and is not "reasonably calculated" to inform
the mortgagee of his impending loss. Nor is publication a reasonable means of
notifying a mortagee of a tax sale when mail service is available.
44
The Indiana tax sale statute required, before a tax sale, notice by certified
41. Adams, 103 S. Ct. at 2716 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 2712. Indiana only required that the owner of the property be given notice of the
tax sale by mail service, IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-24-4 (Burns 1984), and an opportunity to re-
deem. Id. § 6-1.1-25-6(c).
43. Adams, 103 S. Ct. at 2711.
44. Id. It must be assumed that the Court is not indulging in irony when it refers to "the
well-known skill of postal officials and employees in making proper delivery of letters defectively
addressed." Id. at 2711 n.4 (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1914)). Indeed,
one may have full faith in the efficiency of mail service in our country and nonetheless question
whether the Court expects too much of it. In Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982), the Court
referred to mail service as "an inexpensive and efficient mechanism," which was more reliable
than the procedure of posting notice on a tenant's door in a housing project. Id. at 455. Notices
posted on doors, the Court noted, were sometimes removed by children or other tenants. Id. at
453. The dissent in Greene-again by Justice O'Connor--criticized the "total absence of any evi-
dence in the record regarding the speed and reliability of the mails," id. at 456 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting), and pointed out that delivered mail is often subject to tampering and theft, id. at 460
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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mail to the tax property's owner.45 After the tax sale, the statute required
notice to the owner of his right to redeem the property.46 As in twenty-one
other states,47 publication was the only form of notice that Indiana required to
other parties, including mortgagees. Presumably Adams will control cases
arising in those states in which a tax sale could ultimately perfect title in the
purchaser and the mortgagee could lose his interest without any actual
notice.48
The force of this conclusion, however, is reduced by the Court's failure to
reach the constitutionality of a significant post-Adams change in the Indiana
tax sale statute. In 1980 Indiana added a provision that provided for notice by
certified mail to mortgagees who annually requested such notice of the tax
assessor and paid a nominal fee to cover the costs of such notice.49 Since the
events in Adams occurred under the older provisions, the Court explicitly re-
frained from ruling on the constitutionality of notice by request.50 At least
eight states currently provide for notice by mailing to mortgagees if the mort-
gagees request such notice in advance of any potential tax sale.51 In light of
45. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-24-4 (Burns 1984) (to last known address at least 21 days before
sale date).
46. Id. § 6-1.1-25-6 (30 to 60 days before execution of tax deed).
47. ALA. CODE § 40-10-12 (1975); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-388 (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 84-1103 (Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-11-102 (1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, §§ 8724,
8772 (1974 & Supp. 1982); D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1301 (Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. § 134.440
(1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-2180 (West Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §§ 75, 120
(1957 & Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 140.170 (Vernon Supp. 1984); NaB. Ray. STAT. § 77-1804
(1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 361.565 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-38-66 (1983); N.Y. REAL PROP.
TAX LAW §§ 1002, 1014 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1983-1984); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5721,03
(Page Supp. 1982); OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 24312 (Supp. 1983-1984); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-5-
2502, -2514 (1983); Tax. TAX CODE ANN. § 34.01 (Vernon 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-29
(Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 58.1117.1 (Supp. 1983); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 84.64.030 (1983-
1984).
In at least one state, Missouri, consideration of Adams has led to a finding of unconstitution-
ality in the tax sale statute's notice provision. In Lohr v. Cobur Corp., 654 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. 1983)
the state supreme court ruled that a deed of trust beneficiary's interest in property would not be
cut off by a tax sale when the beneficiary had received only publication notice. As Justice Black-
mar observed in a concurring opinion, "To say that [Adams] poses problems is to speak mildly."
Id. at 887 (Blackmar, J., concurring).
48. Adams had the immediate effect of causing the Supreme Court to vacate judgments in
cases from Pennsylvania and Nevada. In First Pa. Bank, N.A. v. Lancaster County Tax Claim
Bureau, 44 Pa. Commw. 301, 404 A.2d 709 (1979), appeal dismissed, 498 Pa. 122, 445 A.2d 97
(1982), vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 3528 (1983), the Pennsylvania courts had upheld the
constitutionality of the state's tax sale procedure. The Nevada case, Continental Co. v. Moseley,
98 Nev. 476, 653 P.2d 158 (1982), vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 3530 (1983), did not involve a
tax sale, but rather notice to creditors with claims against a decedent's estate. Nevada law required
only publication notice to creditors, which the plaintiff argued violated due process requirements.
The expansion of the Adams rule to cover cases arising in probate indicates that the case has
applicability well beyond the confines of tax sale law. See also Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Morrison, 568 F. Supp. 1240 (N.D. Ala. 1983) (applying Adams to foreclosure of mortgage by a
federal agency). If a state's tax sale law does require notice to mortgagees, and such notice is not
given, his lien will survive the tax sale and remain a lien on the property now owned by the tax
purchaser. See, e.g., Santa Cruz v. State, 223 Miss. 617, 78 So. 2d 900 (1955) (failure to give notice
to lienor if required may make sale void as to him though otherwise valid as to owner).
49. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-25-4.2 (Burns 1984).
50. Adams, 103 S. Ct. at 2708 n.2.
51. See ALASKA STAT. § 29.53.260 (1972); FLA. STAT. § 197-072(2) (Supp. 1982); HAvAII
REV. STAT. §§ 246-57, -58 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 63-1126B(4)(c) (Supp. 1981); MAss. ANN. LAws
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the decision in Adams that holds publication alone to be insufficient notice, it
is not unrealistic to assume that some of the publication-only states will adopt
request-notice provisions such as those now in the Indiana tax sale statute.
Adoption of such statutory provisions, however, would not banish the
kind of due process problem raised in Adams. It is arguable that adding re-
quest-notice provisions to state tax sale statutes will satisfy the broad rule that
any interested party must receive actual notice of a tax sale if his name and
address are reasonably ascertainable. Request-notice statutes in effect put the
mortgagee in the position of the taxpayer under the doctrine that regularity of
tax assessments is notice in itself. The difference is that the taxpayer receives
his assessment by operation of the tax law, while the mortgagee in a request-
notice jurisdiction must actively arrange for notification of a tax sale affecting
his interest. Putting such a burden on the mortgagee creates a minimal supple-
mental burden on the tax assessor. Although the tax collector must now send
out more notifications before a tax sale, at least the number of such notifica-
tions will likely be limited 52 by the number of people who request the notice,
ch. 60, § 38 (Law. Co-op. 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-375(c) (Cum. Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 57-27 02 (1983) (for notice of redemption); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 312.140, .150 (1983).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-375(c) (Cum. Supp. 1983) provides as follows:
The tax collector filing the certificate ... shall, at least 30 days prior to docketing the
judgment, send a registered or certified letter, return receipt requested, to the listing tax-
pyer at his Last known address, and to all lienholders of record who have filed with the
offie of the tax collector of the taxing unit or units in which the real property subject to
his lien is located a request that he be notified of the docketing of a judgment under the
procedure set forth in this section, stating that the judgment will be docketed and that
execution will be issued thereon in the manner provided by law .... The request from
the lienholder shall be made on a form supplied by the tax collector and shall describe
the real property, indicate whose name it is listed in for taxation, and state the name and
mailing address of the lienholder. If within 10 days following the mailing of said letters
of notice, a return receipt has not been received by the tax collector indicating receipt of
the letter, then the tax collector shall have a notice published in a newspaper of general
circulation in said county once a week for two consecutive weeks directed to, and nam-
ing, all unnotified lienholders and the listing taxpayer that a judgment will be docketed
against the listing taxpayer. The notice shall contain the proposed date of such docket-
ing, that execution will issue thereon as provided by law, a brief description of the real
property affected, and notice that the lien may be paid off prior to judgment being
entered.
See Washington, Forty Acres, No Mule: A Survey of Land Laws and How They Affect Blacks
in Two Southeastern States, 5 N.C. CENT. L.J. 36 (1973). The author concludes that "It]he proce-
dure as outlined in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-375 reeks of unconstitutionality." Id. at 58.
52. Some New York cases offer illustrations of the hazards facing those who fail to register
with the tax collector. Although New York has no state statute providing for request of notice, the
New York City code does have such a provision. In Tobias v. College Towne Homes, 110 Misc.
2d 287, 442 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1981), plaintiff was the assignee of a lien from the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which had taken it as receiver for a failed bank. The FDIC had
failed to register with the tax collector under the request-notice section of the city code, so the
assignee was not entitled to notice.
Because of this failure to register its interests in the property, the FDIC was clearly not
entitled to have tax bills or notice of foreclosure action mailed to it.
To hold otherwise would not only be in contravention of the statutory provisions,
but it would also place a wholly unreasonable and impractical burden upon the City to
give written notice of a tax foreclosure to interested persons who are unknown and un-
identified to the City's finance administator.
Id. at 291, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 384 (citations omitted). In Lily Dale Assembly, Inc. v. County of
Chautauqua, 72 A.D.2d 950, 422 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1979), plaintiff had been record owner of a piece
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and in any case the tax collector need search no further than the face of the
request to ascertain who is to receive notice. But, however attractive the re-
quest-notice statutes may appear to taxing authorities, the statutes are likely to
prove only a stopgap in meeting the requirements of due process for mortga-
gees of a tax sale property. The Supreme Court is unlikely to sympathize with
the complaints of tax assessors that any requirement of research in the re-
corder's office would impose too great a burden on them. In Adams the Court
clearly demanded that tax officials check for recorded mortgages; constructive
notice will be acceptable only when the mortgagee is not "reasonably identifi-
able."53 A more compelling basis for arguing that request-notice statutes will
not satisfy due process requirements afterAdams is that theAdams Court was
clearly concerned with protecting the interests of parties who are less knowl-
edgeable about complex transactions.5 4 Sophisticated mortgagees undoubt-
edly would take any steps necessary to ensure receiving notice of an
impending tax sale but the "least sophisticated creditor"5 5 is likely to remain
unaware that he can and should request such a safeguard.5 6 This reasoning
suggests that the limited protection provided by the request-notice statute does
not satisfy the Mullane-Adams due process requirements. Knowledgeable or
not, every mortgagee is entitled to notice "reasonably calculated" to reach
him, provided his name and address are available in the public records.
The facts of Adams portray the fundamental distinction between owners
and mortgagees of property for purposes of the notice required by due process.
Mennonite Board of Missions, the mortgagee, did not know that taxes were
falling in arrears on the mortgaged property; MBM had no notice from the tax
of land for 65 years, but he was not listed on the tax assessment rolls. The appellate division ruled
that the assessor had no duty to make a "diligent inquiry," id. at 952,422 N.Y.S.2d at 241, into the
identity of the property owners in order to sell the land for taxes.
Even duly registering on the tax rolls may not suffice in New York. In Brock v. Holmes, 49
A.D.2d 1011, 373 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1975), the taxpayer and his son had the exact same name, and the
appellate division ruled that the defendant tax collector had complied with requirements of notice
to a listing taxpayer by sending notice of a tax sale to the name and address on his records.
If the notice failed to reach plaintiff it was because of his indiscriminate use of the identi-
cal name of the plaintiff by his son who was living in the same village. By doing so,
plaintiff must be held to have assumed the risk that an otherwise reasonable service, and
one that had provided actual notice to him of a prior default, could go astray and be
received by his son.
Id. at 1012, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 925.
53. Adams, 103 S. Ct. at 2711.
54. Id. at 2712. The Indiana court of appeals reasoned that MBM "freely chose to enter an
area of sophisticated financial investment and thereby necessarily chose to incur the risk inherent
therein. The State cannot reasonably be expected to assume the risk of its citizens' business ven-
tures." Adams, 427 N.E.2d at 690 n.9. It might be noted that the MBM is a nonprofit, charitable
organization. Tax purchaser Adams, on the other hand, if not sophisticated, was certainly exper-
ienced. Two months before the Indiana court of appeals ruling in the MBM case, Adams won an
appeals court decision in another case in which the owner had insufficiently pleaded lack of no-
tice. By not placing the notice failure in issue, the owner had not preserved his exception. Lenard
v. Adams, 425 N.E.2d 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
55. Adams, 103 S. Ct. at 2712.
56. Even an institutional, for-profit lender may fail to request notice. Thus, in Guaranty
Mortgage Corp. v. Town of Burlington, 385 Mass. 411, 432 N.E.2d 480 (1982), a mortgage com-
pany had not taken advantage of the request notice provision, see supra note 5 I, but the tax sale
was upheld despite the fact that the company did not receive notice.
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assessor.57 The mortgagor, however, did have notice from the tax assessor, as
the Indiana tax sale statute required. In a significant number of other states, it
is possible to conduct a tax sale to cut off an owner's right of redemption with-
out any notice to the owner beyond publication.58 As noted above, the regu-
larity of the tax duty places the owner on notice that he may lose his property
if he fails to pay the tax.5 9 The Supreme Court has not yet squarely faced the
question whether notice by publication in tax sales meets the due process test
for property owners.60 The issue has arisen in at least three cases appealed to
the Supreme Court without resolution. An appeal from a West Virginia case
was dismissed,6 1 and the decision in an Oklahoma case was vacated on other
grounds.62 The appeal from a New York case, Botens v. Aronauer6 3 offered a
particularly egregious example of publication's failure to put an owner
threatened by a tax sale on notice. In Botens a surviving joint tenant had
requested the tax collector to send to her all future bills and other correspon-
dence, and she had given the collector her address. Despite these precautions,
the collector found an outstanding tax debt on the property and sent a re-
demption bill to the deceased joint tenant. This bill was returned to the collec-
tor's office, and no further action was taken on it. Moreover, although both
the property and the joint tenants were located in a city of thirty thousand
with its own widely read newspaper, the collector placed notice of the tax sale
in two newspapers in a small village twenty miles away. Each of these news-
57. Adams, 103 S. Ct. at 2709.
58. In 1975 21 states allowed a tax sale to be conducted to final cutoff without actual notice to
the owner. Note, supra note 18, at 1506. Today, the number of states has decreased slightly,
mostly because of judicial decisions. See infra notes 67-69.
59. See Note, supra note 18, at 1511-13.
60. The Court has faced a due process challenge of a tax sale. It reversed a lower court ruling
that had upheld a tax sale when the property owner was incompetent. The tax assessor knew the
owner was incompetent, yet took no steps to appoint a committee for her until after the foreclo-
sure judgment. Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956).
61. Pearson v. Dodd, 221 S.E.2d 171 (W. Va. 1975), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 396 (1976).
The owner of an oil and gas interest, which was unrecorded after the 1937 purchase from the
owner's son, lost it through a tax sale. The state supreme court upheld the tax sale statute, W. VA.
CODE § 1 A-4-12 (1983), under which an owner has the right of redemption for only 18 months
after a tax sale. Thereafter, the owner can only petition for redemption.
62. Christie-Stewart, Inc. v. Paschall, 502 P.2d 1265 (Okla. 1972), vacated on other grounds,
414 U.S. 100 (1974). Defendant Paschall owned a 15/16 mineral interest in land. Neither surface
nor mineral owners paid the property taxes on the land in 1952; the following year the state
bought the tax lien (original sale) and later sold the lien to Paschall's cross-defendant (resale).
Plaintiff Christie-Stewart, Inc., leased the oil and gas rights from both codefendants and sued for
quiet title to the lease and royalty rights. The Oklahoma court ruled against Paschall, holding that
every Oklahoman with an interest in land was charged with knowing that he owed taxes and that
land might be sold for failure to pay tax. Further, Paschall was charged with notice of the time
and place where the property would be sold. Id. at 1267. Mullane would have applied, the court
said, if the purchaser had applied for a treasurer's certificate deed, because the timing of such an
application would be strictly up to the purchaser.
In Resales the County Treasurer gives notice by publication (to owners who already
statutorily know the time and place of the sale) that the land win be sold at the time and
place specified by statute unless the taxes are paid. Thus the publication notice of the
Resale is supplemental to other action which had conveyed a warning to the owners of
interests in the land; a traditional and acceptable use of publication.
Id. at 1268.
63. 38 A.D.2d 969, 331 N.Y.S.2d 816 (1972), aft'd, 32 N.Y.2d 243, 298 N.E.2d 73, 344
N.Y.S.2d 892, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1059 (1973).
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papers had a circulation of less than two hundred. 4 The New York courts
upheld the sale. Even though the owner knew nothing of the sale until she
had lost her property, the sale had conformed with the requirements of the
state tax sale statute. The United States Supreme Court dismissed the ap-
peal,65 thus avoiding an opportunity to apply Mullane to a case in which no-
tice by publication had almost certainly not been "reasonably certain to
inform" the affected party.
66
A few state courts have ventured where the Supreme Court would not.
The highest courts of Michigan,67 Hawaii,68 and New Jersey69 have ruled por-
tions of their state tax sale statutes unconstitutional when the statute required
no more than publication notice to a property owner before a tax sale became
final. Each case was decided on the basis of Mullane.7° Should Mullane apply
to owners as well as mortgagees of property when a tax sale is to be held, or a
tax deed issued? Adams, with its broad reference to proceedings "which will
adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any party,"' 71 should be read
64. The opinion of the trial court, Botens v. Aronauer, 66 Misc. 2d 5, 319 N.Y.S.2d 698
(1971), aj-d, 38 A.D.2d 969, 331 N.Y.S.2d 816 (1972), ay'd, 32 N.Y.2d 243, 298 N.E.2d 73, 344
N.Y.S.2d 892, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1059 (1973), explains the choice of newspapers. County
law required publication of legal notices in two newspapers representing the principal political
parties of the county supervisors. The choice of two small village newspapers on the basis of
political partisanship simply conformed to the law.
65. Botens v. Aronauer, 414 U.S. 1059 (1973) (lack of a substantial federal question).
66. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315.
67. Dow v. State, 396 Mich. 192, 240 N.W.2d 450 (1976). Neither the Dows nor the Smiths,
the Dows' landlords, were given notice of the tax sale. Mrs. Smith was sent notice of redemption,
but she took no action on it, and did not advise her husband. The court held that since the Smiths'
property interest was readily identifiable, they were entitled to have the state provide them with
notice of the tax sale's pendency. The court also held that if the Dows' interests were recorded, or
if the assessor or treasurer was aware of their interests, they were also entitled to have notice of the
tax sale. Dow is noted in Note, Notice by Publication is Constitutionally Inadequate in a Tax Sale
Proceeding, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 1463 (1978).
68. Klinger v. Kepano, 635 P.2d 938 (Hawaii 1981). The original patentee of a piece of land
died and left it to his issue. The land was sold for failure to pay regular property taxes in 1962.
The tax purchaser sold the land in 1971 to plaintiffs Klingers. When the Klingers first visited the
property in 1974, they found the original owners still inhabiting it, and filed an ejectment suit in
1975. The court held that failure to notify the original owners heirs, who were listed in the tax
department, was a denial of due process and invalidated the tax sale. The court indicated that,
under Mullane, even if the tax office had listed no other information about the owners than that
the owner was a decedent's estate, further inquiry would have been required.
69. Township of Montville v. Block 69, Lot 10, 74 N.J. 1, 376 A.2d 909 (1977). New Jersey's
In Rem Tax Foreclosure Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:5-104.29 to -104.71 (West Supp. 1983), re-
quired only publication and posting. d. § 54:5-104.42. The corporate property owner received
letters from the tax collector warning that it was in arrears on its property taxes, but not that a tax
sale was pending. In holding the tax sale invalid, the court said that after Mullane "it is clear that
newspaper publication would suffice only where it is not reasonably possible or practicable to give
more adequate notice." Township of Montvylle, 74 N.J. at 17, 376 A.2d at 917. The statute was
amended by 1979 N.J. Laws, ch. 414. Beginning in 1980, service was required in addition to
publication and posting.
70. Mullane was also the basis of the decision in Laz v. Southwestern Land Co., 97 Ariz. 69,
397 P.2d 52 (1964) (en banc). The tax purchaser notified, as required under the tax sale statute,
the owner, but not the mortgagee, that he intended to fie for a tax deed. The purchaser argued to
the court that the tax sale was an in rem procedure, and therefore he could rely on publication
notice. The court ruled the in rem argument invalidated by Mullane. Moreover, the purchaser
could not claim that the mortgagee's name and address were not readily ascertainable, since he
had joined the mortgagee in a quiet title action and served process on him.
71. Adams, 103 S. Ct. at 2712.
[Vol. 621102
as requiring actual notice to owners as well as mortgagees. It is difficult to
imagine the Court encouraging taxing authorities to favor mortgagees over
owners; at least the owners should be entitled to equal protection. As the Indi-
ana Court of Appeals noted in justifying preferential treatment for owners,
"traditionally, the law has ensconsed the rights of homeowners in the safety of
significant procedural protections. '7
2
A more difficult question is whether the regularity of tax bills puts the
owner of property on notice that failure to pay will lead to a tax sale. Put
another way, is it reasonable to expect the taxpayer to know that the govern-
ment will sell his property, worth thousands of dollars, for delinquent taxes of
perhaps a few hundred dollars? A 1975 article on this subject offers the most
logical answer:
The only basis for the presumption that the delinquent taxpayer
knows what will happen is the general legal fiction that "everyone
knows the law." In reality, this is a rather dubious assumption.
Since landowners will have had prior experience with the annual as-
sessment of taxes on their property, it is safe to assume that they will
know that taxes are due each year on their land. But, since most own-
ers pay their taxes every year, they will not have had prior experience
with the tax sale system; it is doubtful that they will know the conse-
quences of missing a tax payment.
73
In other words, the presumption of notice to owners based on their regular
receipt of a property tax bill should not obviate, under the due process rules
set out in Mullane and Adams, the need to provide actual notice to owners
threatened by a tax sale.
In sum, the effect of a tax sale is usually harsh for those who lose their
property interest, because in most instances the property is sold to pay an
amount of back taxes far lower than the value of the property.74 This disparity
will result no matter what kind of notice interested parties receive, if they take
no steps to save their property. Accepting, however, the necessity of tax sales
as means of both enforcement and collection, any taking of land for satisfac-
tion of a tax debt should comply with the requirements of due process set forth
in Mullane. Mullane's rejection of publication notice reflected the Court's
awareness that publication simply did not serve the modern property owner
with the adequate warning that he might need to take steps to protect his prop-
erty from potential loss. Adams reflected the Court's continuing concern that
notice by publication alone often amounts to no notice at all. The decision
72. Adams, 427 N.E.2d at 689-90.
73. Note, supra note 18, at 1511-12.
74. A typical example is Wager v. Lind, 389 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), in which plain-
tiff's house and lot, valued at $15,000, were sold for $174, the amount of the tax delinquency. The
judge in Wager distinguished Botens on the grounds that in that case, the owner at least knew the
procedure for tax redemption; in Wager, a "sharp-eyed buyer" had taken advantage of the inexpe-
rence of a "widow of modest background." The judge ruled that a substantial federal question
had been presented, and called for the seating of a three-judge court. Unfortunately, there was no
further reported action on what might have been the most direct route to a Supreme Court deci-
sion on the need for notice to owners in tax sales.
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should serve notice on taxing authorities that those with an interest in property
must have a fair chance to protect that interest, and to do so, they must have
reasonable notice of a tax sale.
JAMES SAINTSING
